Hereditary stress as a cultural force in mathematics  by Wilder, R.L
HISTORIA MATHEMATICA 1 (1974), 29-46 
'HEREDITARY STRESS AS A 
CULTURAL FORCE IN MATHEMATICS 
BY R,L, WILDER, UNIV, OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA 
SUMMARIES 
Among the forces affecting the course of mathematical 
evolution is what the author has called "hereditary 
stress." The term designates a cultural, not a. 
psychological force, and it is internal to mathematics, 
not environmental. It appears to be synonymous with 
what A. L. Kroeber called "potentialities" and G. Sarton 
termed "growth pressure." Neither of these scholars gave 
any analysis of it. The present article attempts to do 
this in the restricted context of mathematics. 
Its chief components seem to be: (A) Capacity. The 
quantity and intrinsic interest of the results that the 
basic theory and methodology of a field are capable of 
yielding. (B) Significance. The field's promise of 
yielding results significant for the advancement of 
mathematics or related fields. (C) Challenge. The 
emergence of problems whose solutions require an ingenuity 
and/or methodology which distinguish them from those 
problems whose solutions are of a more routine character. 
(B) Status. The esteem in which the field is held. 
(E) Conceptual Stress. The stresses created by the need 
for new conceptual materials to furnish a logical basis 
for explaining phenomena; outstanding among these is 
symbolic stress. (F) Paradox. Emergence of paradoxes 
or inconsistencies. 
These are discussed individually. Analysis of Component 
(E) , for example, shows that it evidently stems from 
several sources; e.g., the necessity for a new concept which 
will afford means of solving problems previously inacces- 
sible: stresses created by the need for introducing order 
into a chaos of materials recognizably related; and the 
need for new attitudes toward mathematical existence and 
mathematical "reality." 
Parmi les forces qui influent sur le d&eloppement 
des mathgmatiques est ce que l'auteur a no& la" tension 
h&&ditaire" ("hereditary stress"). Le terme indique 
une force culturelle et non pas psychologique, et il est 
intrinsbque aux math&matiques non pas extrinsaque. Cela 
parait btre synonyme de ce que A. L. Kroeber appelait 
"potentialities" et de ce que G. Sarton nollPnait "growth 
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pressure." Ni l'un ni l'autre de ces savants ne l'ont 
analysb. Le p&sent article tente de le faire, mais 
s'entient au contexte math&atique. 
Les parties constituantes semblent en 6tre: IAl - 
capaciti. La quantite et l'inter& intrinseque des 
rksultats que la theorie de base et la m&thodologie sont 
capable de donner. [B] La port&e. La promesse du domaine 
de dormer des r&ultats significatifs a l'&volution des 
mathknatiques ou au domaines s'y rapportant. [C] Le defi. 
L'dmergence des problsmes dont les solutions exigent une 
ingeniositg et/au une mkhodologie que les distinguent de 
ces problZmes dont les solutions sont d'un caractke 
routinier. [D] Le rang. L’estime dont jouit le domaine. 
[E] La contrainte conceptuelle. Les contraintes c&&es 
par le besoin de matikes nouvelles conceptuelles pour 
fournier une base logique pour expliquer les phenombne; 
au premier plan de celles-ci ce trouve la contrainte 
symbolique. IF] L-e paradoxe. L'knergence des paradoxes ou 
ou des inconsistances. 
Toutes ces parties sont discut&es individuellement. 
L'analyse de la partie [El, par exemple, demontre que 
cela provient de plusieurs sources; e.g., la n&essit& 
d'un nouveau concept qui offrira les moyens de resoudre 
des probl&mes auparavant inaccessible; les tensions 
cr6Qesparlane'cessit&d'introduirel'ordredanslechaosdes 
matikesreconnuescommes'yrapportant, etlan&essitBd'atti- 
tudesnouvelles versl'existence et la "realit6“math&atique. 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
In studying the history of a culture or a cultural system 
(e.g., a political system, a religion, a science), one is struck 
by the manner in which pre-existing states exercise an influence 
on currently developing aspects of the system. This influence 
is so great as to seem, in many instances, deterministic. Thus, 
although the individuals involved seem to be solely responsible 
for the direction that these developments take, it is neverthe- 
less apparent that their materials, tools, methods, and even 
their ways of thought have for the most part been bequeathed to 
them by their predecessors. The much quoted remark commonly 
attributed to Newton (*) "I stood on the shoulders of giants," 
was an explicit recognition of this situation in science. 
History from a Cultural Standpoint. In recent times a number 
of scholars have argued for the treatment of history from a more 
cultural point of view. (**) Emphasis on the individual and on 
* But see Merton 1965. 
** See, for instance, Bagby, Committee on Historiography, and 
Shapiro, esp. Chap. 2. Shapiro states (pp. 100-101): 
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individual events is, of course, important and not to be neglected. 
But it should not constitute the sole method of historical 
research. Likewise, the documentation of mass movements, 
political events, etc., while necessary, is bound to lose much 
of its value if not complemented by interpreting them as 
cultural developments. For example, to treat the problem of the 
clustering of genius as merely an accidental occurrence provides 
no explanation of the phenomenon at all, Modern genetics leads 
one to conclude that the number of potential geniuses in any era 
is essentially a constant ratio of the population. Our modern 
knowledge of culture makes clear that the explanation of the 
clustering of genius lies in the emergence of a cultural develop- 
ment which provides, even requires, the opportunity for the 
expression of genius. (*) 
As we shall use the notion, a culture is an excellent example 
of the maxim, “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” 
For a mere aggregate, or set, with no relations between its 
elements, this is of course not the case. However, endow the 
set with relations and the maxim does hold. Thus, when relations 
are established between the elements of a set so as to provide an 
order between them or a topology, the set becomes much more than 
a set, being then an ordered set or a topological space. In the 
case of a culture, relations between the persons carrying the 
culture are many and varied, depending upon how well integrated 
the culture may be. 
The relations between the carriers of a culture are established 
and maintained by communication. And communication depends upon 
the symbolic faculty which man possesses. Without this faculty, 
human aggregates would be merely societies, such as are exempli- 
fied in animal and insect societies. Societies are determined 
by biological and genetic faculties, while cultures, although 
influenced by biological (and other, such as environmental) 
factors, are dependent upon communication by means of symbols. 
Man’s immediate ancestors were presumably grouped in small bands 
like the chimpanzees, but with the emergence of man and culture, 
larger societies were formed in the interests of, life adjustments, 
such as cooperative hunting. 
Central to the formation of larger groupings was the increased 
efficiency of communication, which made possible the ultimate 
emergence of religions, traditions, folkways, taboos, etc., 
forming the binding -- and “time-binding” -- cohesive relations 
,r . . . anthropology by its cultural orientation is more likely to 
provide the kinds of tools and the concepts that would reveal 
the way in which our patterns of living and our cultural 
processes shape our institutions and control our history.” 
* For an extended analysis of this, see White 1949, Chap. 8; 
also see Kroeber, pp. 839ff. 
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within the group. (*) Analogous to the case of a mathematical 
system in which the basic set has been ordered, topologized, 
algebraicized, or what not, the group now forms what the 
anthropologist calls a culture. When we speak of an individual 
as having been "molded by his environment," by "environment" we 
mean "culture." The effect of the culture on the individual, as 
well as on subsystems of the culture, is by no means passive. 
In particular, the history of mathematics forms a culture 
continuum or stream into which the individual mathematician is 
introduced, chooses his area of interest (a process largely in- 
fluenced by chance and genetic endowment), and analyzes and 
synthesizes the cultural elements than existing; when his 
contribution has been made, the culture stream flows on to his 
successors. 
"To say that the calculus was invented by Newton and Leibniz 
is to identify these events historically or biographically but 
it does not explain them as events in a culture process. Why 
did these events take place when and where they did? We wish to 
know this too as well as what particular person made the discovery 
.,.,. An invention, discovery, or other significant advance is an 
event in a culture process. It is a new combination or synthesis 
of elements in the interactive stream of culture. It is the 
outcome of antecedent and concomitant cultural forces and 
elements." [White 19501 
It is the study of cultures that occupies the cultural 
anthropologist, and it is to the point of view of mathematics as 
a cultural system or "pattern system" that we shall address 
ourselves in the present study. 
"We shall never fully understand human culture unless we look 
at it as a portion of the evolutionary process... the culture of 
a given society cannot be understood merely as the sum of the 
behaviour and products of the individuals comprised in the 
society. It is composed of super-individual patterned systems 
of activity, potential as well as actual, all to a certain degree 
integrated in an over-all pattern of the whole. In any 
scientific attempt to study and understand cultures, it is the 
patterned systems that are important and significant, rather than 
the individual activities in which they issue." [Huxley 1960, 711 
Our concern, however, will be not so much with the position 
of mathematics as a culture system among other culture systems, 
and the influences of the latter on mathematics,. as with the 
internal development of mathematics. Moreover, we shall be 
particularly interested in the nature o.f the internal cultural 
force or stress which appears to have been the major stimulus to 
the evolution of mathematics through the centuries. 
* Compare N. Wiener, pp. 326-328, where he seems to be trying 
to bring out such ideas as these. He says, "Communication is 
the cement of society." Substitute "culture" for "society," 
and the meaning becomes identical to that above. 
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PART II. MATHEMATICS AS A CULTURAL SYSTEM 
Perhaps nowhere, among the subsystems that various cultures 
have generated, are the “dynamics” or mechanism of this cultural 
force better illustrated than in mathematics. Political systems, 
following their initial evolution, tend to become static, and 
evidence change only when compelled, a process frequently 
attended by violence. Religions, likewise, once established, 
seek to perpetuate themselves, and exhibit change only under 
compulsion. But in scientific systems, and especially in 
mathematics, the changes are more gradual even though they may 
stem from similar forces within the system. This can be 
explained by the fact that religious and political systems 
exercise a highly personal and emotional influence upon their 
participants; but scientific systems are more impersonal in 
character. Moreover, scientific systems operate on the principle 
that alterations -- even abandonment -- of basic concepts and 
methods must be made whenever such changes promise better to 
achieve the aims of the relevant systems. 
The “dean” of American anthropology, A. L. Kroeber (1876- 
1960), made a detailed study [1944] of the growth patterns of 
scholarly systems (philosophy, science, philology, etc.; 
mathematics was treated only as a part of science). These 
systems did not exhibit a common growth pattern, and probably if 
a similar study were made of the various subfields of mathematics, 
a like conclusion would ensue. (*) A branch of mathematics may 
seem virtually to die out, and then suddenly take a new lease 
on life if, for instance, its concepts are refreshed by consoli- 
dation with concepts from other branches; or if a demand for its 
concepts arises either from other parts of mathematics or for 
applications outside of mathematics. 
Kroeber seems to have strongly suspected the existence of 
general factors common to most cultural systems; however, he did 
not focus his attention thereon. Thus, in his study of the 
pattern of philosophical growth [Kroeber, 901 he remarks that 
“Such a system bears in itself certain specific potentialities, 
and also specific limitations, which enable it, even compel it, 
barring catastrophe from outside, to realize or fulfill itself 
to the terminus of these potentialities, but not to go beyond 
them. When the given set of potentialities is exhausted, the 
growth ends... there is no further growth until a thoroughly 
new set of impulses has arisen under new circumstances....” 
* Studies made by D.deS. Price (see, e.g., Price 1961, esp. 
Chap. 5) indicate the inevitability of the eventual leveling 
off of activity in any scientific field, due to such factors 
as the natural upper bound for the number of possible 
workers, the growing unmanageability of the bulk of research 
results, etc. Also see May 1968; and for a detailed study of 
the 1ifeand”death” ofamathematicaltheory, see Fisher 1966. 
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And while rejecting the “idea that there is an underlying factor 
or set of factors determining the cultural history of humanity 
as a whole” (pp. 90-91)) he continues: “What the forces are that 
cause such activity within pattern systems, we do not know. We 
can call them cultural energy, for want of another label or 
better metaphor. Cultural energy would at bottom be psychic or 
physiological activity, but manifested through cultural channels 
and in cultural forms. For its specific quality we are there- 
fore thrown back onto our culture patterns. It appears that it is 
through the objective, empirical, critical study of these that 
we can at present best hope to understand better what cultural 
energy is: they are its most, or one of its most, salient 
manifestations .” Later (p. 92) he concludes: “What holds of 
pattern systems in philosophy presumably holds for other 
departments of culture; and expectably, in some measure at least, 
for culture wholes .” 
Another who seems to have sensed the existence of internal 
forces within a cultural system was the late science historian 
G. Sarton, who declared [Sarton 19521, “The whole fabric of 
science seems... to be growing like a tree; in both cases the 
dependence upon the environment is obvious enough, yet the main 
cause of growth -- the growth pressure, the urge to grow -- is 
inside the tree, not outside.” (Italics mine -- R.L.W.) 
In another connection (*), I have used the term “hereditary 
stress” in a way which seems synonymous to what Kroeber called 
“potentiality” and Sarton termed “growth pressure,” although 
my use of the term was restricted to mathematical systems. So 
far as I have been able to ascertain, no one has sought to 
analyze further the nature of this “force,” (**I other than to 
* See Wilder 1968. This book was intended as a preliminary 
study of the processes by which mathematics evolves, and 
not as a contribution to the history of mathematics per se 
(as some seem to have assumed); the historical items chosen 
for exposition were only a means to an end. 
** Our use of the term “force,” also used by Kroeber in the 
quotation above, is perhaps unfortunate, since it has con- 
notations that are not intended here. The analogue in physics 
of the term as used here would be “Anything that changes or 
tends to change the state of rest or motion of a body.” All 
of the stresses or processes that we denote by the term 
“force” are such as to cause change in the existing state of 
a field, with the possible exception of cultural lag and 
resistance. For these perhaps it is appropriate to appeal 
to Definition III of Newton’s Principia: "The vis insita, 
or innateforceofmatter, is apowerofresistance, bywhich every 
body, asmuchasinitlies, continuesinitspresentstate,whether 
itbeofrest,orofmovinguniformlyforwardsinastraight line.” 
(See Wilder 1968, p. 149 fn). At any rate, we have tried in 
vain to find a more suitable word. 
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acknowledge its existence. It should not, however, be permitted 
to acquire a mysterious or mystic character, since it can be 
adequately analyzed in spite of the difficulties encountered in 
separating it from those other forces that affect scientific 
growth. (*) Forces or stresses affecting the evolution of a 
mathematical or scientific concept usually act in conjunction, 
and may be as difficult to separate as are environmental and 
hereditary influences in the biological and psychological 
realms. 
One might surmise that it would make the analysis easier to 
handle if one narrowed down the field studied to a subfield of 
mathematics. One might concentrate, for instance, on the 
evolution of a special kind of geometry or algebra. But this 
appears not to be practicable. Every historian is familiar with 
the way in which scientific fields tend to generate “specialties,” 
which in some cases eventually come to be considered as different 
“sciences” and to be represented by distinct “departments” 
within the university . In the United States this process has 
accelerated in mathematics since 1900, as is well attested by 
the increase in the number of new professional associations 
(ten in 1972) which share membership in the Conference Board of 
the Mathematical Sciences (CBMS). Of course one may try the 
reverse and take the whole field of science into consideration. 
Certainly hereditary stress operates in every scientific field, 
as Sarton clearly realized. Indeed, as the above quotations 
from Kroeber indicate, all cultural systems give evidence of the 
existence of such a force. 
Despite these considerations, we shall continue to concentrate 
our study on mathematics, partly because of personal limitations, 
but mainly because the field is now both broad enough in scope 
as well as possessed of the depth of intellectuality to exhibit 
all the forces to which cultures in general are subject in 
varying degrees. At times we may, however, find it convenient 
to illustrate the operation of hereditary stress by using, 
instead of the whole field of mathematics, only a subfield 
thereof. Whenever this is done, one should be warned that a 
force may change character when considered only relative to a 
subfield. For example, a stress which is certainly internal to 
mathematics may prove to be environmental from the standpoint 
of the subfield. An example of this may be found in the need, 
for some purpose in the subfield of analysis, say, for a 
topological result which has not even occurred to workers in the 
field of topology; hence a call for it from workers in analysis 
serves as an external stimulant (i.e., an environmental stress) 
* For a list of these forces, see Wilder 1968 or the article 
Wilder 1972. In the article, I have added “specialization” 
to the eleven other forces listed in the book. 
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to the latter. This is of course the analogue of the environ- 
mental stress which is exerted on mathematics by the needs of 
physical or behavioral sciences. 
There is nothing strange here; as we narrow the field 
studied, what is internal may become external. This is not the 
case with forces such as abstraction, generalization, or 
diffusion, which have an absolute character; diffusion within a 
subfield from one area thereof to another is still diffusion in 
the field as a whole (and vice versa). But in studying 
hereditary stress, the relative character of the force must be 
kept in mind. In order to prevent confusion, then, we make the 
convention that while “field” may refer to either the whole 
field of mathematics, or to a recognized branch or subfield of 
it, whenever it becomes necessary to specify whether a subfield 
is being indicated, we shall explicitly state so. We shall not 
find it necessary to distinguish between “orders” of subfields; 
we may call the theory of determinants a “field” or a “subfield” 
even though it is itself a subfield of algebra (which is again 
a subfield of mathematics). 
In addition, we must emphasize that of the two aspects, 
cultural and psychological, of the growth of mathematics, we are 
considering only the cultural. The cultural is the primary 
aspect; in a culture devoid of science, there would be no 
scientists. As remarked above, the incidence of individuals 
capable of creative scientific work is not the factor which 
causes occurrence of a period of great scientific activity. 
Rather, it is the cultural state of science, both from an 
external and an intrinsic point of view, which is the determining 
factor. A culture in which science is not encouraged or is 
suppressed will not produce good science (if any), no matter how 
many potential scientists there may be among the carriers of the 
culture. In short, the psychological aspect of the growth of 
science is a process of reaction and creative synthesis on the 
part of the individual scientist responding to his scientific 
subculture. 
It is necessary, therefore, especially in the study of 
hereditary stress, to exercise care in separating the 
psychological from the cultural; for hereditary stress is a 
cultural, not a psychological, stress even though its effects on 
the individual are psychological. This may prove difficult in 
some cases. A phenomenon which may superficially appear to be 
involved in hereditary stress may be only the psychological 
effect of external (environmental) stress. Consider competitive- 
ness, for example. This unquestionably operates as a very 
effective agent in the growth of science. Nevertheless, it may 
be simply a psychological result of what the sociologist R. K. 
Merton calls the “Rewards System” in science -- as well as a 
contributor to the frequency of those priority disputes whose 
episodes clutter the history of science.[Merton 1957; 1963; Cole 
and Cole 1967; 19681 
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Our problem is further complicated by the fact that not only 
psychological factors may cause confusion in the attempt to 
analyze hereditary stress. Certain other cultural stresses, 
important to the growth of science, may at first appear to 
constitute a part of hereditary stress, whereas closer 
examination reveals this not to be the case. Such, for instance, 
are certain environmental stresses of a cultural nature. 
Prominent among these is the “Rewards System” already mentioned. 
As Merton [1957, 6391 pointed out, “in the institution of 
science originality is at a premium. . . . recognition and esteem 
accrue. . .to those who have made genuinely original contributions 
. . . ” This is well known among scientists and scholars in general, 
so that we need not further emphasize its importance. It should 
be pointed out, however, that it is properly included among the 
cultural stresses of an environmental nature rather than as 
part of hereditary stress. Anthropologists have found cultures 
in which the desire for recognition of higher status, intellec- 
tual or otherwise, does not exist. (*) In such cultures, if 
such an ambition occurs it is frowned upon. Thus while 
unquestionably contributing to the motivation of the individual 
worker in a science, and hence to the growth of the latter, the 
Rewards System of the culture is not an inherent ingredient of 
the hereditary stress of a field. 
Another aspect of environmental stress that may strongly 
influence the growth of a mathematical field is demand for its 
concepts from without mathematics. Here care must be exercised, 
however. Demand from without mathematics refers to an external 
need, and the remarks made above regarding the relative 
character of hereditary stress apply. Since we have made the 
convention that we are restricting our study to mathematics, 
a demand for certain mathematical concepts from physics, for 
example, is clearly external. On the other hand, a need in 
topology for algebraic concepts is actually a hereditary stress 
so far as mathematics is concerned, in that it stems from a 
natural growth within mathematics. 
It is to be expected that some of the other forces which were 
singled out in Wilder [1968, 1691 will participate in the 
operation of hereditary stress. This is true particularly of 
consolidation, diversification, abstraction, and generalization, 
all of which will be found to contribute. Moreover, it appears 
that hereditary stress per se is not a single, specific force, 
but the resultant of a number of components which we list below; 
discussion of these will follow. The word “field” in this 
listing refers generally to a specific subfield in mathematics. 
* See, for example, the discussion of Zuni culture in Benedict 
1946. 
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PART III. COMPONENTS OF HEREDITARY STRESS 
A. Capacity. The quantity and intrinsic interest of the 
results which the basic theory of the field is capable of 
yielding. 
B. Significance. The field’s promise of yielding results 
significant for the advancement of mathematics or related fields. 
C. Challenge. The emergence, within the field, of problems 
whose solutions require an ingenuity and/or methodology which 
distinguish them from those problems whose solutions are of a 
routine character. 
D. Status. The esteem in which the field is held among 
mathematicians. 
E. Conceptual stress. The stress created by the need for 
new conceptual materials in order to furnish a logical basis for 
explaining phenomena; outstanding among such phenomena is sym- 
bolic stress. 
F. Paradox. The emergence within the field of paradoxes or 
inconsistencies. 
Before discussing these individually, we remark that not all 
of them need be operative or effective at a particular time. 
During the period when the basic theory of the field is not 
fully formed, either intuitively or specifically -- a period 
which may be called the antecedent or precursor period -- compo- 
nent A (the capacity) will still be in its formative stage. 
Also, component F (paradox) will usually not be present at all, 
even when the field has reached a mature stage, especially 
insofar as inconsistency is concerned -- although in notable 
cases (e.g., set theory) it may occur. In short, hereditary 
stress is not a constant associated with a field, in that it 
may increase or decrease with the passage of time. 
A. Capacity. What is it that constitutes the “basic theory” 
of the field? In the ideal case, this may be an axiomatic system, 
precisely set forth as in the case of such modern algebraic 
theories as the theory of groups or category theory, or as in 
the more elementary case of Euclidean geometry in its modern 
form. On the other hand, in the case of a theory just emerging, 
the basic theory will perhaps exist only in intuitive form. An 
excellent example is set theory, which existed for decades only 
in intuitive form. During this period, however, component F in 
the form of the classic set-theoretic antinomies became operative 
and forced the formulation of axiom systems to serve as explicit 
bases from which one hoped contradictions would not be derivable. 
Other cases of precursor periods (a) during which the theories 
existed only in intuitive form may be found in Euclidean geometry 
(whose precursor period lasted for centuries); theories such as 
that of the real continuum and topology (which passed through 
* We have borrowed this term from D. J. de S. Price [1961, 105, 
fine print]. 
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precursor periods devoted to solutions of special problems); 
and group theory, which appeared here and there in mathematics 
before being recognized as having the potential of a field in 
its own right. During the precursor period, there usually 
exists very little conscious realization of the potential of 
the intuitive notions for forming a special field; only after 
these notions receive explicit formulation may the capacity 
become evident. Thereafter, the more perceptive workers in the 
field become aware of the problems that are most significant for 
the theory’s development, and will sense its capacity for future 
development. By the same token, they will recognize when it has 
reached its zenith and started to decline -- when, like a mine, 
it has been nearly “played out.” 
Once the basic theory of a field has been established, then 
the structure that will be erected thereupon is essentially pre- 
determined. Just who the individuals will be that discover and 
establish the main results will depend upon both chance and 
individual genius. Chance and the personalities and genius of 
the workers in the field will also affect the order of develop- 
ment of the field, as well as the time consumed in developing it; 
nevertheless, given the basic theory and the culturally approved 
methods of proof, the field will ordinarily be developed in its 
general outlines independently of personalities. Whether 
problems will evolve whose solution the basic theory is theoreti- 
cally capable of solving, but that will remain unsolved because 
of the failure of individual genius to cope with them, is 
impossible to say. Is Fermat’s famous theorem unsolved because, 
as some seem to think, the basic number theory is incapable of 
furnishing a solution, or because no one has yet been able to 
solve it? 
Usually involved in the capacity of a field are the forces 
abstraction and generality. The higher the level of abstraction 
reached by a field, the greater will be the degree of generality 
attained and the greater the capacity. An excellent example of 
this is category theory, which appears to have acquired such a 
high level of abstraction that the classical set theory, which 
has heretofore been considered adequate as a foundation for all 
mathematics, may no longer furnish sufficient basis. Another 
good example is general topology, which has increasingly reached 
higher levels of abstraction and generality and, as a consequence, 
increased capacity. 
The contribution of such factors as these furnishes at least 
partial explanation for the increasing power of modern mathema- 
tics, as evidenced in its ability to solve problems hitherto 
inaccessible. A similar comment may be made concerning the 
concomitant increased power of the younger mathematicians, who 
enter a field at the high level of abstraction already attained, 
when its capacity is nearing a maximum; to them, the high level 
of abstraction seems natural -- it is where they begin their 
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research (and, incidentally, where many of the oldest generation 
of mathematicians leave off, or turn to problems on levels at 
which they have been formerly successful [*I). 
B. Significance. With the basic theory agreed upon and its 
development well under way, the field’s promise of yielding 
results significant for the advancement of mathematics or 
related fields begins to emerge. In some cases the full reali- 
zation of the field’s significance may not become evident until 
the further development of other fields in which the field in 
question may prove important. In extreme cases, interest in the 
field may lag, and production actually stop, only to be revived 
perhaps years later when the field’s significance becomes 
evident, or radical new methods are introduced. The latter may 
be particularly important when the cause of the stoppage of work 
in the field has been due to the frustration caused by the 
emergence of problems that resist all attempts at solution. 
Successful solution frequently occurs when new methods embodying 
concepts from other fields are found applicable. An elementary 
example was the solution of the problem concerning the independ- 
ence of the parallel axiom, which was followed ultimately by 
increased interest in geometry. When revival of interest in the 
field is due to the discovery of its significance, the latter may 
be a significance relative to other than mathematical fields. On 
the other hand, it may happen that the entire field may be 
swallowed up by another field having greater generality and 
power. 
As one might suspect, significance and capacity are narrowly 
related. Usually the most significant fields are those with 
great capacity, and vice versa. However, there apparently are 
exceptions. One can compare the situation with that between 
fame and quantity of production on the individual level. Usually 
the two go together, but there are notable exceptions; because 
of the brevity of his life, tialois’s production of creative work 
* An interesting psychological problem is involved here, into 
which no one, so far as I know, has inquired -- possibly such 
an inquiry would not prove popular! But it would be interest- 
ing to know, in all the cases where older mathematicians have 
left a field when it reached higher levels of abstraction, 
whether their motives were inspired by inability to cope with 
the new, encumbered as they are with conceptual materials no 
longer of use, whether they just lost interest, or whether 
they seized the opportunity offered, perhaps by retirement, 
to explore other fields -- even to initiate them -- or 
whether -. There is little doubt in my mind that all of 
these motivations have occurred. Moreover, higher levels of 
abstraction often involve consolidation with elements from 
fields that the individual may dislike. 
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was by no means commensurate with his fame, and his case is only 
one of several which come easily to mind. Conversely, a mathe- 
matician’s lifetime production may be quite prodigious, yet not 
significant enough to warrant great fame. Analogously, a field 
may have great capacity, if measured by the volume of results it 
can yield, yet its significance for mathematics may be quite 
negligible in the long run. How much of the volume of work which 
was done on special curves is significant today? 
C. Challenge. Once it is evident that a theory promises to 
bear mathematical “fruit ,‘I and/or to have considerable importance 
either for its applications in other fieldsof mathematics or for 
its capability of furnishing tools in sister sciences, then its 
attraction to the professional mathematician usually becomes 
irresistable, with consequent enhancement of status. The 
competitiveness (*) induced by the challenge to solve the 
significant problems in the field will then serve as further 
stimulation. If, moreover, the theory yields problems which seem 
to defy solution and to require both unusual ingenuity and new 
methods or principles, then so much greater may be the contribu- 
tion to the hereditary stress activating the field. That is, 
although as pointed out above, frustration could eventually lead 
to loss of interest in the field, the result may be precisely 
opposite. 
D. Status. The “status” of a field may also be termed its 
reputation or its popularity among mathematicians. Status is 
susceptible to simple measurement at any given time by what we 
might call the “worker ratio.” As the term implies, worker 
ratio refers to two fields, of which one is a subfield of the 
other. For extunple, the worker ratio of algebra to the whole 
field of mathematics is by definition the ratio of the number 
of people doing creative work in algebra to the total number of 
creative mathematicians. Obviously this ratio varies with the 
time, so that in using the concept, the date when it is computed 
shouldbe specified, especially if comparison of the ratio at 
different historical periods is to be made. Otherwise, we may 
take it for granted that a particular time is tacitly assumed. 
And since we are restricting discussion to mathematics, we may 
simply speak of the “worker ratio of algebra,” for instance, to 
denote the ratio used in the definition above. 
The significance of the concept of status lies mainly in the 
fact that the greater the status of a field, the greater will be 
the impulse for creative mathematicians to work in it -- “to get 
on the bandwagon.” Graduate students who observe the growing 
popularity of a field, as evidencedby its growing status, are 
tempted to devote their dissertations to it. Also, workers in 
neighboring fields whose subject matter is close to that of the 
field in question tend to be drawn to the latter if its status 
* However, in a given case, competitiveness may be only due to 
the “Rewards System,” as pointed out above. 
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is increasing. Obviously any or all of the components capacity, 
significance, and challenge may -- and probably will -- 
influence status. 
E. Conceptual stress. The stress created by the need for 
new conceptual materials may arise in one or more of several 
ways : 
(1) Now and then there has occurred in mathematics a kind of 
“symbolic stress in reverse.” Specifically, a symbol may be 
created either by mathematical operations applied outside the 
rangeoftheir original intent, or through invention, with 
subsequentrejection of its meaning and search for a suitable 
meaning. An instance of the first kind was lla.ll As a symbol, 
its meaning was simply “the square root of -1,” and it was the 
result of applying algebraic operations to the solution of 
equations and treating it as an admissible number obeying the 
same laws as the classical counting numbers. Although it was 
promptly rejected as “impossible,” within the framework of the 
solution of equations formal manipulations with it led to “real” 
solutions. Consequently, although its meaning was rejected 
since -1 simply did not have any square root within the domain 
ofknownnumbers, its use persisted even though it sometimes 
yielded “impossible” solutions. (*) Its ultimate meaning as one 
of the units of the complex number system was a result of the 
stress created by its obvious usefulness. 
Another classical example concerns the calculus symbols 
“dy/dx” and the individual “dx” and “dy” devised by Leibniz. 
Although these worked beautifully for the purposes for which 
they were devised, they formed a chief target of criticism of 
both mathematicians and philosophers. Various meanings were 
proposed; the differentials dx and dy became known as “little 
zeroes,” whose properties were mysterious and unaccountable. 
Fortunately the mathematicians using them forged ahead with their 
investigations, encouraged by their success in applications and 
inspired, perhaps, by such beliefs as are exemplified in 
d’Alembert’s “Go forward and faith [meaning -- R.L.W.,] will come 
to you.” Satisfactory meanings could not be forumulated, of 
course, until a much higher mountain was scaled. In the mean- 
time, the need for the new tool embodied in the “d-symbols” 
could not be denied, thereby contributing to the stress for a 
definition that would complete their symbolic character. 
* Albert Girard (1595-1632), the one first to formulate the 
fundamental theorem of algebra in the opinion of many 
historians, stated: “If someone were to ask what is the 
purpose of the solutions that are impossible, then I answer 
in three ways: for the certitude of the general rule, and the 
fact that there are no other solutions, and for its use. The 
use is easy to see, since it serves for the invention of 
solutions of similar equations....” [Struik, 861 
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(2) The necessity for a new concept which will afford a means 
of solving problems hitherto inaccessible has frequently arisen. 
The introduction of the concept of the completed infinite in 
order to cope with problems such as were being encountered in 
connection with the nature of the real continuum and (Riemann) 
integrability is a classic example. The stress created in this 
instance ultimately forced the invention of a theory of the 
infinite, as well as its eventual acceptance by the mathematical 
majority. 
A related phenomenon, separated from that just mentioned by 
two millenia, was probably the theory of proportionality intro- 
duced by Eudoxus in order to handle incommensurables and 
irrationals. Note that these cases differ fundamentally from 
those in which the introduction of already familiar concepts 
is involved, such as the application of the theory of equations 
to the solution of the angle trisection problem -- which seems 
rather to have been a case of consolidation [Wilder 19681. In 
the present case we are dealing with a process which lies at the 
heart of the advance of mathematics, as opposed to the mere 
problem-solving process. And modern mathematics furnishes 
numerous examples of the process, such as the emergence of the 
structural point of view in mathematics, which considers mathe- 
matics as a science of structures and relations -- a point of 
view which has proved most productive. 
(3) Another type of conceptual stress is found in the stress 
created by the need for introducing order into a chaos of 
materials recognizably related. As variety and proliferation of 
theories multiplies in a given area, the need grows for intro- 
ducing some order or “logic” which will render it both easier 
to understand and to assimilate. The resulting stress 
eventually results in new points of view or more generalized and 
abstract theories which reveal common structures within whose 
framework the special theories fit into place. Klein’s Erlanger 
Programm furnishes an excellent example here; by analysis of the 
nature of the various geometries, both existing and emerging, 
Klein settled upon the notion of invariants and their groups as 
a means of distinguishing between and identifying these 
geometries. Likewise, the recently evolved category theory . 
furnished a means for classification and identification of the 
various homology theories which had been proposed in algebraic 
topology. 
(4) On an even grander scale is the itress which results in 
the creation of new attitudes toward mathematical existence and 
mathematical “reality.” For example, in order to make room within 
mathematics for such structures as non-Euclidean geometries, it 
was necessary to give up the idea that mathematics is either a 
description of physical reality or an embodiment of truth in the 
ordinary sense. If one persisted in speaking of “truth” in 
mathematics, he would have to relate it henceforth to a basic 
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theory; a theorem was now to be considered “true” only if it 
was derivable from the basic theory by recognized methods, and 
then its truth is only relative to the basic theory. 
This new attitude contributed enormously to the creation of 
new mathematics, although it did not authorize unrestricted 
freedom. Freedom to introduce new theories remained tied to the 
existing culture; not until the latter had been augmented by new 
attitudes toward what is permissible in mathematics could the 
requisite “freedom” be exercised. No longer need mathematics 
justify itself by its so-called “reality.” The new freedom 
allowed one to introduce new conceptual materials wherever they 
would prove of significance and contributory to the currently 
evolving conceptualbody of mathematics. This was a freedom having 
a temporal character, in that it was modified by the current 
needs and interests of mathematics. What is not significant in 
one period may turn out to be so in a later period. This, 
incidentally, contributes to an explanation of the historical 
“singularities” that occur in the sciences -- the inventions 
that occur “before their time.” History provides many examples 
of credit for a “discovery” given to an individual whose good 
luck it was to introduce it at the time when it was most needed 
-- precisely at the time when it became most significant -- 
although historical research later reveals that the discovery 
was made earlier by someone else. 
Acceptability of new conceptual materials plays a related role 
of course, in that such materials may not be acceptable at one 
time yet find no difficulty achieving status later as cultural 
attitudes change. It can be surmised that Saccheri might have 
achieved credit for the invention of non-Euclidean geometry if 
the mathematical culture of his time had advanced to the level 
which nineteenth-century mathematics reached; the invention of 
new algebras, for instance, was already acceptable. As it was, 
he “settled” for a spurious “Enclides Vindicatus” which 
accorded perfectly with the views constituting the mathematical 
culture of his time. And even though the nineteenth-century 
viewpoint had been modified to the point where the non-Euclidean 
geometries might achieve recognition, this was not accomplished 
without a struggle. 
The new theories of “constructive mathematics” which are 
currently being introduced as alternatives to the classical 
Intuitionism may indicate that the pendulum of “mathematical 
reality” is swaying the other way. These theories would restrict 
the freedom of mathematics in the methodological area; but just 
how many “converts” they will attract is at present impossible 
to predict. Like most radical proposals, they will understand- 
ably encounter much cultural resistance. From our point of 
view, however, they furnish another example of the creation of 
new attitudes toward mathematical existence and mathematical 
“reality.” 
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F. Paradox. Finally, should paradoxes or inconsistencies 
emerge in a theory, then any of several results may follow. If 
the paradox does not turn out actually to involve any inconsist- 
ency, then so much the greater will become the challenge to 
explain it -- thus adding a further element to the hereditary 
stress within the field. If on the other hand, real inconsist- 
ency does appear, then there will arise a challenge to recon- 
struct the basic’ theory and/or the methodology in use in the 
field, so as to avoid the inconsistency; this is especially 
likely to be the case where the concepts provided by the field 
have already proved their significance. Here again, the case 
of set theory is a classical example. 
Concluding Remarks. The above discussion of the components 
of hereditary stress could be considerably amplified and enhanced 
by further use of historical details, especially as regards the 
uses of the notions involved in actual historical research. The 
concept of hereditary stress, along with the other concepts of 
forces operating in mathematical evolution [Wilder 19681, can 
serve not only for purposes of clarification and explanation 
of historical events, but can provide a new tool for search of 
historicaloriginsby way of pointing out what types of events to 
look for. Moreover, the investigation of how these forces have 
operated suggests problems which have heretofore either not been 
considered, or have been neglected as beyond the scope of 
historical methods. 
Even in the area of biography, knowledge of these forces can 
contribute new angles, especially in questions regarding 
motivation. If the individual worker is so much a product of 
his cultural heritage, then cultural forces certainly affect his 
behavior. It will already be apparent that one’s genetic heri- 
tage makes it possible for him to be a genius, perhaps, but it 
is his cultural heritage that provides him with the motivation 
and equipment to express his genius. 
However, we reserve further validation of these assertions 
for a later paper. Since, as already emphasized, hereditary 
stress does not operate alone, it is necessary to analyze other 
forces more adequately than was done in my elementary study 
[1968] in which they were originally introduced. The force of 
consolidation, in particular, needs further analysis. We 
realize that historians have not neglected the cultural environ- 
ment in which individual geniuses were nurtured. Historians of 
mathematics have been careful to show the connection between old 
and new developments, thus exhibiting a sense of the continuity 
of mathematical evolution. We only propose extensions and 
elaborations. The discovery of the concept of culture occurred 
relatively recently and has not even yet become thoroughly dis- 
seminated among scientists. The tradition of historical writing 
became established before it was possible to treat mathematics 
as a cultural artifact. Consequently, historians have been 
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deprived of new conceptual tools for augmenting their methods of 
historico-scientific explanationwhich might illuminate phenomena 
not understood or -- worse still -- which have been “explained” 
on a lower level of experience (usually the psychological) in 
a manner which cannot withstand critical inspection. 
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